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Establishing Backward Causation
on Empirical Grounds: An
Interventionist Approach
Alexander Gebharter1 , Dennis Graemer2 & Frenzis H. Scheffels2
1University of Groningen
2University of Düsseldorf
We propose an analysis of backward causation in terms of interventionism that can avoid several
problems typically associated with backward causation. Its main advantage over other accounts
is that it allows for reducing the problematic task of supporting backward causal claims to the
unproblematic task of finding evidence for several ordinary forward directed causal hypotheses.
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1 Introduction
According to Faye (2018), the concept of backward causation “raises two sets of questions:
those concerning conceptual problems and those that relate to empirical or physical
matters” (ibid., §. 2). Conceptual problems include bootstrap paradoxes (cf. Mellor
1991), consistency paradoxes (cf. Lewis 1976), and the bilking argument (cf. Black 1956).
Empirical and physical matters comprise the problem of finding a physical realizer
for backward causal relations and the question of how to establish backward causal
hypotheses. In this paper, we cover both kinds of questions to some extent. After
introducing Woodward’s (2003) interventionist theory of causation in Section 2, we
propose an interventionist analysis of backward causation in Section 3. We also argue
that this analysis does not run into conceptual problems such as the ones mentioned
above. Then, in Section 4, we turn to empirical matters: Since interventionism has no
implications for how causation might be physically realized, we bracket the problem of
finding a physical realizer for backward causation and rather focus on showing how the
account can be used for supporting backward causal claims on empirical grounds by
testing several quite harmless forward directed causal hypotheses.While interventionism
is not the only theory of causation that can avoid conceptual problems, the fact that it
provides the resources to empirically establish backward causal relations is what clearly
sets it apart from other accounts. To further emphasize this main advantage, we compare
our account to three other types of theories of causation. We conclude in Section 6.
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2 Interventionism
In this section we introduce the basics of interventionism required for our analysis
of backward causation. Interventionism is based on the simple idea that effects can be
influenced by manipulating their causes. (Woodward 2003, p. 59) provides the following
manipulationist characterization of causation:
(M) X is a direct cause of Y w.r.t. V if and only if there is a possible intervention on
X w.r.t. Y that will change the probability distribution of Y when all other variables
Zi ∈V are fixed by intervention. X is a contributing cause of Y w.r.t. V if and only if
there is a directed path from X to Y such that there exists a possible intervention on
X that will changes Y ’s probability distribution when all other variables in V that are
not on this path are fixed by interventions.
In order to intervene on X with respect to (w.r.t.) Y , a so-called intervention variable is
required (Woodward 2003, p. 98):
(IV) IX is an intervention variable for X w.r.t. Y if and only if the following four
conditions are satisfied:
(1) IX causes X.
(2) Some of IX ’s values (the intervention variable’s on values) screen X off from all its
other causes Zi.
(3) If IX causes Y , then only through X.
(4) IX is statistically independent of any cause Zj of Y that causes Y over a path that
does not go through X.
An intervention on X w.r.t. Y can then be defined as an intervention variable IX for X
w.r.t. Y taking one of its on values that is associated with a change in X. The notion of an
intervention variable is designed in such a way that it picks out exactly those potential
causes IX of X that can be used for testing whether X is a (direct or contributing) cause
of Y w.r.t. a set of variables V. (For details, see Woodward 2003, §. 3.1.4.)
Before presenting our analysis of backward causation, a few remarks on interven-
tionism seem appropriate. Firstly, intervention variables do not have to describe human
actions. Secondly, interventionism is a type-level theory introducing causation as a rela-
tion between variables. Thirdly, direct and contributing causation are characterized rela-
tive to a set of variables, but the notion of an intervention is not relativized in that way.
When speaking of causation in (IV), Woodward (2003) consequently refers to what he
later called causation simpliciter: X is a cause of Y simpliciter “as long as it is true that
there exists a variable setV such that X is correctly represented as a contributing cause of
Y with respect to V” (Woodward 2008, p. 209). Fourthly, not all four conditions in (IV)
are actually required to account for direct and contributing causation in terms of (M).
As Baumgartner and Drouet (2013, pp. 186f) show, (2) is actually dispensable. Finally,
neither (M) nor (IV) make any reference to time, which renders the theory in principle
compatible with forward, simultaneous, and backward causation. We agree with Haus-
man (1998) that this is a virtue of a theory of causation; in the case of interventionism
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it allows one to use the theory as a tool for investigating questions concerning backward
causation on empirical grounds.
3 Analyzing backward causation
Let us now come to explicating backward causation within interventionism. We propose
the following analysis:
(BC) X is a backward cause of Y iff (i) X is a cause of Y simpliciter and (ii)
Y-instantiations brought about by interventions on X w.r.t. Y occur strictly
before the corresponding X-instantiations.
Condition (i) specifies the genus and condition (ii) the differentia for backward causation
to the background of interventionism. (M) and (IV) guarantee that the only explanation
for a change in Y induced by an intervention on X w.r.t. Y requires X to be causally
relevant for Y , and (ii) that the direction of X’s causal influence on Y is actually backward
in time.
Note that the notion of backward causation proposed is metaphysically cautious. As
we will see below, it does not come with strong metaphysical commitments, which is
mainly due to the fact that interventionism itself is a metaphysical lightweight account of
causation. Condition (ii) is, for example, weak enough to allow for changes in Y that
occur simultaneously or later than changes in X if these Y-changes are not induced
by an intervention on X w.r.t. Y . As a consequence, interventionism allows—at least
in principle—for temporal loops: Y might turn out to be a forward cause of X while
X is a backward cause of Y . But would this not imply that the account of backward
causation proposed runs directly into bootstrap paradoxes? The problem here seems to
be that the cause presupposes its effect which, in turn, presupposes its cause. Firstly,
note that interventionism renders the question of whether such temporal loops exist
an empirical one—its answer fully depends on whether the right interventions exist. It
might well be the case that they do not. Secondly, casting intuitive doubt does not suffice
to constitute a paradox. For a serious problem it would be required that the possible
existence of causal cycles somehow leads to inconsistencies. But this seems not to be
the case in an interventionist setting. Everything required for a causal cycle between two
variables X and Y is the existence of an intervention on X w.r.t. Y being associated with
changes in Y ’s probability distribution and the existence of an intervention on Y w.r.t. X
inducing changes in X’s probability distribution. Such interventions clearly exist if X and
Y describe, for example, the positions of two magnets on a table. This is, of course, a case
of simultaneous causation. However, it shows that the consistency of this scenario to the
background of interventionism does in no way depend on the times at which X- and/or
Y values are instantiated.
Note that the account proposed can also avoid consistency paradoxes. Such paradoxes
typically arise when changing the past trough backward causation would result in
inconsistencies. A classical example would be a case where a person travels backward in
time and kills her younger self.The problem consists in the fact that if backward causation
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is possible, the following two propositions seem intuitively plausible, while taken together
they are inconsistent:
1 It is possible for someone to kill her younger self.
2 It is impossible for someone to kill her younger self.
Proposition 1 is plausible because nothing seems to exclude the possibility to kill one’s
younger self when going backward in time is possible. Killing someone is (moral issues
aside) an ordinary human action like any other. And Proposition 2 is plausible because
killing one’s younger self seems to prevent one from going back in time and killing
one’s younger self. Again, we favor empirically informative approaches to metaphysical
issues and, thus, think that intuitive plausibility should not be considered as a reliable
test for the seriousness of a problem. The implementation of backward causation into
interventionism provides a much handier evaluation tool: It is easy to see that Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 are not supported by an interventionist treatment of backward causation.
As already said, whether backward causal relations exist (an assumption on which both
1 and 2 build) becomes an empirical question within an interventionist framework. In
addition, interventionism does neither provide the resources to infer the possibility nor
the impossibility for someone to kill her younger self if backward causal relations exist.
The theory does not even imply that present or future events can actually change any-
thing that already happened in the past. In other words, it does not imply that the value
a variable Y has actually taken can be changed afterward by intervening on Y ’s backward
cause X. Strictly speaking, everything interventionism says about backward causation
is that Y-instantiations induced by interventions on X w.r.t. Y occur strictly before the
corresponding X-instantiations.
Finally, the threat posed by the bilking argument can also be avoided. In a nutshell,
the bilking argument says that if X is a backward cause of Y , then Y-instantiations
brought about backward in time byX-instantiations can, even after they occurred, still be
prevented by intervening onX.The problem is that the preventedX-instantiations cannot
have caused these Y-instantiations, which contradicts the assumption that they actually
did. Here comes the interventionist response: Firstly, note that the argument requires
reference to variable instantiations being causally relevant for variable instantiations. It
smuggles token-level causal claims into interventionism that lack a clear meaning to the
background of that framework. What we can say from the viewpoint of interventionism
anyway is the following: Whether X can actually be controlled by an intervention after Y
has taken one of those values that depend onX-values induced by interventions onXw.r.t.
Y is irrelevant forwhetherX is a backward (type-level) cause ofY .The only thing required
for X to be a backward (type-level) cause of Y is that there exists a suitable intervention
variable IX for X w.r.t. Y such that I = on induces changes in Y ’s probability distribution
when all off-path variables are fixed by interventions and that the relevantY-values occur
strictly before the changes in X induced by I = on. Also note that an effect variable such
as Y taking a certain value can typically have different causes. So it seems plausible to
infer from the observation that Y takes one of those values it typically takes under an
intervention on X w.r.t. Y and that X has been prevented to take one of those values
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typically associated with these Y-values by another intervention, that another cause of Y
must be responsible forY ’s taking this particular value (or thatY has taken this particular
value by chance, if we allow for indeterministic causation). The situation is structurally
identical to a scenario in which an ordinary effect Y of X takes a value y that is typically
associated with values x1, … , xn of X brought about by an intervention on X w.r.t. Y and
in whichX has actually been forced to take a value xi (with i> n) by another intervention.
The obvious consequence from such an observation is that Y has taken value y because
of another cause (or, again, by chance).
Note that interventionism is not the only theory of causation that can avoid the
conceptual problems discussed above. However, to the best of our knowledge no one
has yet argued that interventionism can avoid these problems and the work needs to be
done.The fact that the theory can avoid these problems is also essential for its usefulness
when it comes to establishing backward causal hypotheses on empirical grounds. Would
it run into conceptual problems, then the theory would not be much worth, even if it can
support backward causation on the basis of empirical findings.
4 Establishing backward causation
Let us now come to what distinguishes our analysis of backward causation within
interventionism from other accounts: to the question of how backward causal hypotheses
can be supported on empirical grounds. Let us briefly illustrate why this task seems
especially problematic. Assume we want to test the hypothesis.
H: X is causally relevant for Y .
In order to test H, we bring about X-changes via experimental manipulation and check
whether Y-changes occur. If we observe such Y-changes, then there are two possible
explanations:
(a) H is true.
(b) Something went wrong; the experimental setup was flawed, hidden confounders
were involved, etc.
Whether we consider (a) or (b) as more likely and whether we tend to take our result as
evidence for H crucially depends on whether the observed Y-changes occurred after or
before the X-changes. If the former was the case and we do not have specific reasons for
(b), then we tend—in accordance with scientific practice—to interpret the experiment’s
result as evidence forH. If the latter was the case, however,most scientists would probably
shy away from such an interpretation. They would consider (b) much more likely in that
case. Possible reasons for this are that backward causation is somewhat unfamiliar and
has an otherworldly touch, has not been scientifically confirmed so far, is surrounded by
conceptual and other problems, etc.
In this section we argue that an interventionist treatment of backward causation can
help in overcoming this problem. In particular, we argue that the problematic task of
testing for backward causation can be reduced to the unproblematic task of finding
evidence for several ordinary forward causal hypotheses. We tried to keep the formal
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details as minimal as possible. However, since our argumentation crucially depends on
the technical details of interventionism (as introduced in Section 2), we could not avoid to
go into technical details to some extent. Our result directly follows from interventionism,
(BC), and the classical understanding of confirmation as probability increase. Let us
begin by recalling that, according to (BC), X is a backward cause of Y if (i) X is a cause
simpliciter ofY and (ii)Y-instantiations associated with interventions onX w.r.t.Y occur
strictly before the correspondingX-instantiations. (i) is true ifX is a direct or contributing
cause ofY w.r.t. some set of variablesV, and according to (M), this is the case if there exists
an intervention onXw.r.t.Y that induces changes inY if the values of all off-path variables
inV are fixed by interventions. From a logical point of view, (M) thus explicates that X is






where the different parts of Equation 1 are interpreted as follows:
p … X is a cause of Y w.r.t. V.
∃IX(… ) … there exists an IX such that (… ).
q[IX] … IX is an intervention variable for X w.r.t. Y .
r[IX] … Changes in IX are associatedwith changes inY ’s probability distributionwhen
all off-path variables are held fixed.
It hence follows from interventionism that once an IX is found that satisfies the conditions
(1), (3), and (4) specified in (IV)1 for X w.r.t. Y (q[IX]) and changes in IX are actually
associated with changes in Y ’s probability distribution (r[IX]), then X is a cause of Y w.r.t.
V= {X, Y} (p). The r[IX]-part of Equation 1 is easy to test for any candidate intervention
variable IX for X w.r.t. Y . One just has to check whether IX and Y are correlated. The
q[IX]-part, on the other hand, is a little bit trickier. However, establishing the q[IX]-part is
essential because it would guarantee that nothingwas wrongwith the experimental setup,
that is, it would reduce uncertainty about (a) by excluding (b).2 To establish (1), one has to
show that IX is a cause (simpliciter) of X. This is the case iff there is a variable set V
′ such
that IX is a contributing cause of X w.r.t. V
′ . The latter is, according to interventionism,
the case iff there exists a directed path from IX to X in V
′ and an intervention variable
IIX for IX w.r.t. X such that changes induced on IX ’s probability distribution by changes in
IIX are associated with a change of X’s probability distribution if the values of all off-path
variables in V′ are fixed by interventions. To establish that IX is not a cause (simpliciter)
of Y causing Y through X (condition (3)), one has to show that there is no intervention
variable IIX for IX w.r.t. Y and no variable set V
′ (containing IX , X, and Y) such that
changes in IIX are associated with changes in Y ’s probability distribution if X is fixed by
an intervention IX
′ = iX
′ . Note that establishing (3) is more challenging than establishing
(1) because a negative existential can only be established inductively. Finally, condition
(4) holds iff IX is independent of every cause (simpliciter) of Y that causes Y not through
X. Also (4) can only be established on the basis of induction.
Summarizing, q[IX] cannot be established with certainty on empirical grounds. Hence,
Equation (1) does not allow us to infer that X is a cause of Y w.r.t. V (p) with certainty.
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Figure 1: For X to be a backward cause of Y there must be an intervention IX on X w.r.t. Y
that induces Y-changes as demanded by (M) relative to some set V. However, such a finding
might cause doubt about whether IX was actually suitable to infer a backward causal relation
between X and Y; for the reasons mentioned at the beginning of Section 4, (b) might be more
likely than (a). Interventionism comes with the resources for testing whether IX was suitable:
Expand V to V′ and test the ordinary causal hypotheses corresponding to conditions (1), (3),
and (4). Finding evidence for themmakes (b) less and (a) more likely.
This does, of course, not come unexpected. It follows from the fact that (3) and (4) can
only be established inductively.3 However, (3) and (4) can be confirmed by E′ and E′′ ,
respectively:
E′ : No intervention on IX w.r.t. Y we found so far is associated with changes in the
probability distribution of Y if X’s value is fixed by an intervention IX
′ = iX
′ .
E′′ : IX is statistically independent of all causes (simpliciter) Zi ofY we found so far that
cause Y not through X.
Let E be the conjunction of E′ and E′′ . According to the standard view that confirmation
consists in probability increase, E confirms a hypothesis H iff P(H|E)> P(H). Thus, E





. With Equation 1 it then follows that E confirms p as well. If
we now find that (ii) Y-instantiations brought about by interventions IX = ix on X w.r.t.
Y occur strictly before the corresponding X-instantiations, we can finally confirm the
hypothesis thatX is a backward cause ofY .The problem of finding evidence for backward
causation has been reduced to the task of confirming several ordinary causal forward
hypotheses and checking for ordinary correlations between variables. Figure 1 illustrates
and graphically summarizes the basic idea.
5 Comparison with other theories
5.1 Process causation
Process theories (e.g., Salmon 1994) are based on the idea of causal processes and
interactions, where a “causal process is a world line of an object that possesses a conserved
quantity” (Dowe 1995, p. 323) and a “causal interaction is an intersection of world lines
that involves exchange of a conserved quantity” (ibid.). An event ei is then considered
to be cause of another event ej iff ei and ej are connected by a causal process or a
series of causal interactions. It is typically assumed that the cause occurs before the
effect. To make sense of backward causation, one has to lift this requirement, which
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makes process causation a symmetric relation. As a consequence, it will fall out from
establishing that an event ei is an ordinary forward cause of another event ej that ej is
also a backward cause of ei. Although causal processes and interactions are empirically
identifiable, process causation clearly gives usway toomuch backward causation once one
lifts the requirement that causes have to precede their effects. This problem is not shared
by our interventionist approach: Though both analyses allow for establishing backward
causal hypotheses by supporting forward causal hypotheses, our analysis in Section 4
shows that allowing for backward causation within an interventionist framework does,
contrary to the process analysis, not automatically render causal relations symmetric.
Establishing backward causation empirically is a little bit trickier than just supporting
the corresponding converse forward causal hypothesis empirically.
5.2 Laplacean causation
Laplacean causation (e.g., Hitchcock 2012) is based on the idea that each possible state
of a system can be described as a point (or vector) in a state space.The laws of mechanics
rule how each possible state would evolve over time. Properties are identified with
regions in a state space. The points within such a region represent all the possible states
of a system in which the corresponding property would be instantiated. If each point
within a region corresponding to a property P at an earlier point in time lawfully evolves
into a larger region representing another property Q at a later point in time, then P is
identified as a cause of Q.
How could Laplacean causation account for backward causation? Firstly, note that the
laws rule how a system evolves forward and backward in time. To allow for backward
causation would then, again, consist in lifting the restriction that the cause must precede
the effect. The empirical task would then consists in showing that any possible state
instantiating a property P lawfully evolves into a state in the region corresponding to
Q at an earlier time. The problem is that also this analysis would give us way too much
backward causation. Assume the domain of objects we are interested in are apples and
that P stands for the property hanging on an apple tree and Q for the property being
eaten. Now each point in the region corresponding to Q at any time can be evolved into
a point within the region corresponding to P at an earlier point in time, simply because
every apple being eaten grew on an apple tree. It would follow from Laplacean causation
that being eaten is a backward cause of hanging on an apple tree, which seems quite
absurd. It is easy to come up with thousands of similar examples using the same recipe.
Similar problems do not arise for our interventionist analysis: Intervening on whether
apples are eaten makes no difference for whether apples hung on apple trees before.
Also note that finding out which points of a state space make up a region corresponding
to a specific property might be practically unmanageable, while testing ordinary causal
forward hypotheses is a quite straightforward empirical practice.
5.3 Counterfactual causation
According to counterfactual theories (e.g., Lewis 1973), Ei is a cause of Ej if the following
counterfactual holds: If Ei had not occurred, then Ej would not have occurred either. A
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counterfactual like this is true in the actual worldw@ if the closest possible world tow@ in
which Ei did not occur is a world in which also Ej did not occur. Lewis (1979) introduces
the following similarity metric in order to flesh out the idea of closeness between possible
worlds:
(S1) It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law.
(S2) It is of the second importance tomaximize the spatiotemporal region through-
out which perfect match of particular fact prevails.
(S3) It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized simple violations
of law.
(S4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular
fact, even in matters that concern us greatly.
In principle, nothing in the definitions or the similarity metric above excludes that
counterfactual theories can be used for analyzing backward causation. However, there
are special conceptual problems with the similarity metric. (For details see Wasserman
2015.) We add to these problems that counterfactual theories also fail in accounting for
backward causation on empirical grounds. The evaluation of whether Ei is a backward
cause of Ej requires an evaluation of the corresponding counterfactual in the closest
possible world in which Ei did not occur. The problem is that it is unclear how one
can evaluate the relevant counterfactual on empirical grounds. One might think that the
similarity metric will identify the closest possible world in which Ei did not occur with
one in which Ei was prevented by an experimental manipulation. Evaluating the relevant
counterfactual would then simply amount to doing an experiment.The problem is that, as
(Woodward 2003, §. 3.6) has argued, the similaritymetric is far frombeing able to pick out
the right world. What one would ultimately need to pick out the right world are criteria
that guarantee that Ei has been prevented in this world via an experimental manipulation
that satisfies the conditions specified in (IV). (For details, see ibid.) But thismeans that for
counterfactual theories to allow for establishing backward causal hypotheses on empirical
grounds, one would have to replace Lewis’s similarity metric with something that would
come dangerously close to interventionism.
6 Conclusion
We developed an analysis of backward causation within an interventionist framework
and argued that our approach does not fall victim to classical problems, which is an
important minimal requirement for its adequacy. We then showed how an intervention-
ist treatment of backward causation can reduce the problematic task of directly testing
for causal backward hypotheses to the quite harmless task of supporting several ordinary
forward directed causal hypotheses. We thus provided a general methodology for estab-
lishing backward causation on empirical grounds. To further emphasize this advantage,
we finally compared our approach to three other kinds of theories of causation.
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Notes
1 Recall that (2) is dispensable.
2 Recall that the intervention conditions (1), (3), and (4) guarantee correct causal inference.
3 Note that identifying intervention variables within interventionism is always a partially
inductive task regardless of whether the intervention variable is used for establishing
forward or backward causal hypotheses.
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